South Carolina Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 1 Survey of South Carolina Law: April
1961--March 1962

Article 12

1963

Insurance
Wesley M. Walker

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Walker, Wesley M. (1963) "Insurance," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 15 : Iss. 1 , Article 12.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Walker: Insurance

INSURANCE
WESLEY M. WALKER*
Those decisions affecting the area of insurance rendered:
during the preceding year are noteworthy to the extent,
that various points previously touched upon have been given
substantially wider treatment than heretofore, although it
would probably be improper to conclude that any new principles have been developed with respect to insurance.
Termination of Policy
In Turner v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.,1 the insured had been notified by the defendant company that his life insurance policyhad lapsed because of failure to pay premiums, but that the
policy would be reinstated if defendant received the insured's
printed application, together with all past due premiums, by
November 15, 1958. On that date the insured mailed the application and check for the premium, and the company received them on November 17, thereupon depositing the check.
On November 20, the check was presented to the drawee bank,
which refused payment, the reason being the death of the
insured two days earlier, on November 18.
The defendant company contended that all premium checks
were accepted on the condition that they would be honoredupon presentation, and that the banks refusal of same in the
instant case rendered the policy forfeited for non-payment
of premium. The Supreme Court rejected this contention and:
affirmed the decision for the plaintiff, holding that the acceptance of the check, whether conditional or absolute, at
least bound the company not to declare a forfeiture during
the time required for the check to be sent through regular
banking channels to the bank on which it was drawn, and
since the insured had died during this period, the rights of
the parties became fixed and would not be affected by the
fact that the payment of the check was refused by the drawee
bank after the death of the insured.
The case of Moore v. Palmetto Bank & Texitile Ins. Co.2*
involved the cancellation of an automobile policy, notice of
*IMember of the firm of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville,
S.C.
1. 238 S. 0. 387, 120 S. E. 2d 223.
2. 238 S. C. 341, 120 S.E. 2d 231.
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which the company had allegedly mailed to the insured, but
receipt of which the insured denied. In reversing a judgment
entered on a verdict for the insured, the Court held that where
the evidence conclusively showed that the insurer mailed the
notice of cancellation in full compliance with the provisions
of the policy, the insured's denial of receipt of such notice
was not sufficient to support the jury's finding that notice
had not been mailed, and a directed verdict should have been
granted the insurer.
In Nance v. Blue Ridge Ins. Co. 3 the Court pointed out
that where the policy provides the manner of cancellation and
does not make payment or tender of an unearned premium
a condition thereof, the failure to tender or return the unearned portion of the premium does not operate to destroy
the effectiveness of the cancellation of the policy. Upon such
cancellation a debtor - creditor relationship arises between
insurer and insured for the amount of the unearned premium.
Another case dealing with the termination of an insurance
policy was Williams v. Mutual of Omaha4 which was brought
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of South Carolina. However the subject policy was a Florida
contract and under the conflict of laws doctrine was governed
by the law of Florida rather than of South Carolina.
Persons Covered Under Omnibus Clause
An interesting application of the principle of extended
5
coverage is found in the case of Coletrain v. Coletrain,
where a passenger in a taxicab instituted suit against her
husband and the insurer of the taxicab for injuries sustained
when the husband closed the door on her hand as the two of
them were alighting from the cab. The term "insured" under
the policy included any person using the automobile with the
permission of the named insured. The insurer demurred to
the complaint on the ground that the use contemplated by the
policy was that of driving or operating the vehicle.
The majority opinion, which affirmed the overruling of
the demurrer, said:
The provisions of the policy under consideration did not
confine the use of the automobile to any part thereof or
3. 238 S. C. 471, 120 S. E. 2d 516.

4. 297 Fed. 2d 876.
5. 238 S. C. 555, 121 S. E. 2d 89.
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restrict its use to driving or operating same. The coverage extends to the ownership, maintenance, or use of
the automobile with the named insured's consent; and
the use to which the automobile was being put at the
time required the opening and closing of its doors, which
was being done by the defendant, Coletrain, a fellow
passenger rather than the driver.
In the Case of Rakestraw v. Allstate Ins. Co.6 the defendant
issued its insured an automobile liability policy containing
the standard omnibus clause provisions. The insured subsequently left the vehicle with a filling station operator for
purposes of his obtaining a sale. Without the knowledge or
permission of the insured, the filling station operator delivered the vehicle to the plaintiff to paint the same. After
the paint job was completed the plaintiff was involved in an
accident while taking his wife on a Sunday visit in the automobile. Suit was instituted by the plaintiff seeking coverage
under the medical payments provisions of the policy.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision
that plaintiff was not an insured under the omnibus clause of
the policy, stating that:
The permission which puts the omnibus or extended coverage clause of the policy of insurance into operation
may be either express or implied, but whether the permission be expressly granted or impliedly conferred, it must
originate in the language or the conduct of the named
insured or someone having authority to bind her in that
respect.
The Court discussed the various views as to the granting
of permission and pointed out that South Carolina had not
adopted the so-called liberal or extreme view relative thereto. The Court further stated that in the absence of legislation
requiring automobile policies to provide a broader coverage
than is afforded by the usual omnibus clause, it did not feel
justified in extending the terms of an insurance contract
beyond its plain meaning.
In Eagle Fire Ins. Co. V. Mullins 7 the Court was again confronted with the question of permissive use under the omnibus
clause of an automobile liability policy. The evidence indi6. 238 S. C. 217, 119 S. E. 2d 746.
'7. 238 S. C.272, 120 S. E. 2d 1.
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cated that the named insured had knowledge of the fact that
one of his employees was accustomed to driving the insured
automobile to and from work and that the employee's son
occasionally used the automobile about town. There was no
evidence of express permission having been given to either
the employee or his son. On the occasion in question the son
had taken the automobile on a trip to the beach and on the
way an accident occurred in which one of the passengers
was injured. The question was, whether the son was covered
under the subject policy as a permissive user. Over the insured's objections the trial judge charged the family purpose
doctrine and the jury answered the above question in the
affirmative.
On appeal the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that
permission should be limited to the purpose for which it is
given. In reversing and remanding the case the Court held
that there was no evidence that the named insured had impliedly consented to any but the limited use of the automobile
of which he had knowledge. Therefore, the trial judge's
charge on the family purpose doctrine was unwarranted and
prejudicial.
Agent's Right to Commissions
In Taggart v. Home Fin. Group, Inc.8 the plaintiff alleged

that from February, 1957 to October, 1959, he was manager of
the Lancaster office of the defendant loan company; that
during this period he was a licensed agent for the defendant
insurance compaines which were foreign companies doing
business in South Carolina, and that he sold policies for said
companies sufficient to entitle him to commissions in the
amount of at least $120,576.64; that none of the commissions
were paid to plaintiff but were paid to the defendant loan
company which was not licensed to solicit or write insurance.
Plaintiff further alleged under Sections 37-246, 37-247 and
37-254 of the 1952 Code, as amended, he was entitled to commissions on all policies sold by him and that payment on same
to the defendant loan company was in violation of his rights
under the insurance law. He thus demanded an accounting.
Section 37-246 prescribes conditions under which a nonresident may be licensed as an agent to do business in South
8. 239 S. C. 345, 123 S. E. 2d 250.
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Carolina. Section 37-247 provides that all business done by
insurance companies must be done through authorized agents;
and Section 37-254 provides that:
No licensed agent representing any company doing the
business of insurance as defined herein shall pay directly
or indirectly any commission, brokerage or other valuable consideration on account of any policy of insurance
on any risk in this state to any non-resident or to any
resident not duly licensed to act as agent for the type of
insurance involved ....
The defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground
that it failed to state a cause of action and the demurrer was
sustained both in the trial court and on appeal.
The Supreme Court held that the statutes relied on by the
plaintiff are in no way statutes of entitlement and create
no right to receive commissions but only regulate and prohibit
certain splitting by agents of commissions otherwise earned.
The Court stated that while there are provisions imposing a
penalty upon insurance companies for the violation of Section 37-247 and various other sections of the insurance laws,
these penalties are not imposed for the benefit of private
individuals and may, according to the express terms of the
statute, be recovered only in an action brought in the name
of the State.
Agent's Authority
In the case of Skinner & Ruddock, Inc. v. London Guar. &
Ace. Co.9 the plaintiff alleged in its complaint that the defendant insurance company through the defendant agency issued
to plaintiff a policy of insurance in September of 1954, to
indemnify plaintiff in its contracting business against any
losses which might be incurred by it in the course of certain
construction then under contract; that on February 8, 1955,
the defendant agency issued a rider or endorsement extending
coverage of the policy to any loss incurred by the plaintiff
in the wreckage or demolition of certain buildings; that
damage in fact occurred while plaintiff was demolishing
one of these buildings and that claim was made to the defendant agency which, with Crawford & Company, Adjusters,
instructed plaintiff to prepare an estimate of the cost and
proceed with repair, both of which were done by the plaintiff;
9. 239 S. C. 614, 124 S. E. 2d 178.
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that the insurance company thereafter denied coverage on
the grounds that the agent had not been authorized to issue
the rider of February 8, 1955. The defendant agency demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a
cause of action against said defendant. The trial court overruled the demurrer and the agency appealed. The Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court, holding that the complaint
stated a cause of action against the appellant based upon its
alleged unauthorized adjustment of the claim of the plaintiff
under the policy endorsement. The Court also pointed out
that plaintiff would not be entitled to recover against both
defendants; that recovery would be against the insurance
company, if the agent had adjusted the loss within its authority as agent; and that if the loss had been adjusted under
the policy endorsement in question without authority to do
so the agent would be held liable on contract.
In Fuller v. Eastern Fire and Cas. Ins. Co.10 plaintiff,
without designating a particular insurer, purchased an automobile liability policy from one Gillespie, who was not an
authorized agent for the defendant insurance company. Gillespie collected a down payment on the premium and gave
plaintiff and oral binder to the effect that he was covered
as of May 1, 1959; Gillespie then forwarded the down payment and the application to the authorized agent of the company and the policy was issued with effective date of May 5,
1959. However, on May 2nd plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident, and thus arose the question regarding the
effect of the oral binder given by Gillespie.
The insurance company denied that the policy was in effect on May 2nd for the reason that Gillespie was not its
agent at the time application was made by the plaintiff; that
he had no authority to bind the company; and that the attempt to do so was ineffectual since he only made an oral binder without designating the company which would issue the
policy. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff and insurance company appealed.
In affirming the judgment the Supreme Court held that
the acts of the defendant company in accepting the premium
and application of plaintiff and in issuing the policy were
sufficient to support a finding that the company had ratified
the oral agreement made by Gillespie and was therefore
10. 240 S. C. 75, 124 S. E. 2d 602.
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bound by same. The Court stated that although the failure
to designate any company is ordinarily fatal to the validity
of an oral binder, the omission is fully taken care of when
the policy is actually issued as was done in this case.
Accidental Death While Intoxicated
The most noteworthy feature in Outlaw v. CalhounLife Ins.
Co." was the Court's treatement of the "intoxication clause"
in a double indemnity life insurance policy. The pertinent
provision was:
The agreement to pay accidental death benefit hereunder
shall be null and void if death shall have resulted from
bodily injury sustained by insured while intoxicated.
On appeal the Superme Court reaffirmed the general proposition that the burden is on the insurer to prove that the
insured died under conditions which made his death a risk
not assumed by the subject policy. Accordingly, the Court
held that under the quoted provision the mere showing that
the deceased was intoxicated at the time of his death is insufficient to relieve the insurer of liability for accidental
death benefits. To achieve this end the insurer must also
show a causal connection existing between the intoxication of
the deceased and his death.
Coverage of Goods in Transit
The case of Huckabee Trnsp. Corp. v. Western Assur.
C0.12 involved a question of coverage with respect to an item
of freight which was damaged while being transported by
plaintiff-insured without its knowledge. This particular piece
of freight had been inadvertently included in a fully loaded
trailer under seal which trailer was transferred to the insured
from another carrier. The bill of lading purported to cover
the entire shipment but did not list the item in question.
Subsequent to the transfer the trailer was involved in an accident in which most of the contents were damaged. The
insurer paid for the damage to freight listed on the bill of
lading but refused to pay for the item in question contending
that it was not within the terms of coverage.
By the subject policy it was provided that the insured
would be protected against ".. liability to others as a private
11. 238 S. C. 199, 119 S. E. 2d 685.
12. 238 S. C. 6065, 121 S. E. 2d 105,
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or common carrier or under bills of lading or shipping receipts . . .", and further that the "insurance shall attach
and cover... only while the said goods are in the custody of
the assured and in due course of transit."
In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff-insured the
Supreme Court held that the word "or" in the above provision was used as a co-ordinating conjunction introducing an
alternative and thus there was no requirement that the goods
be transported by the insured under a bill of lading or shipping receipt because this was the alternative of the insuring
agreement. The Court also held that the item in question
was in the custody of the insured and in the due course of
transit at the time of the loss. The Court relied on the testimony that it was customary in the trucking business for a
carrier to receive and accept a fully loaded trailer under seal
without making any examination of the contents and without
knowing the contents other than what was revealed on the
bill of lading or shipping receipt.
Obligation of Insurer to Defend
In the case of Miles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Is. Co., 13
the insurer issued to the insured an automobile liability policy
providing coverage in the amount of $5,000.00 per person for
injuries received in any one accident. The policy expressly
excluded from coverage "bodily injury to the insured or any
member of the family of the insured residing in the same
household as the insured." While this policy was in force,
an accident occurred in which the insured's daughter-in-law,
Laverne Miles, was injured. For some time prior to the
date of the accident, Laverne had lived with the insured but
was living elsewhere at the time of the accident. Notwithstanding this fact, the insured gave a written statement to
the insurer's claims representative to the effect that Laverne
was residing with the insured at the time of the accident.
Laverne brought suit against the insured for injuries sustained
as a result of the accident. The insurer refused to defend
this suit and Laverne obtained a default judgment against the
insured for $12,500.00. Laverne then brought a suit against
the insurer for $5,000.00 which was the limit of coverage
under the policy. The question of Laverne's residence at the
time of the accident was submitted to the jury who found that
13. 238 S. O,374, 120 S. E. 2d 217.
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Laverne was not residing in the same household as the insured
at that time and, therefore, returned a verdict against the
insurance company for $5,000.00. The insured then instituted
this action against the insurer for $7,500.00, being the excess of Laverne's judgment against the insured, alleging
negligence and bad faith on the part of the insurer in not
properly investigating the matter of Laverne's residence and
in failing to settle her claim. A verdict was directed for
the insurance company and the case was appealed.
In affirming the judgment for the insurer, the Court held
that the company had the right, so far as the issue of good
faith was concerned, to rely upon the statement given to it
by its insured. The Court pointed out that had the company
probed further into the question of residence by way of testing
the correctness of insured's statement, it might have resolved
that question otherwise than it did; but its failure to do so
afforded no basis for the charge of bad faith. The Court
also added that the determination of the issue of residence
in the suit between Laverne and the insurance company had
nothing to do with the issue of good faith in this case.
Construction of Policy
In Quinn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 14 the plaintiffinsured sought medical payment benefits under a policy provision insuring against injuries resulting from "being struck by
an automobile." The complaint alleged that plaintiff had
stopped along the highway to watch a wrecker get out of a
gully near the road and while so doing the wrecker spun
a piece of timber which had been placed under the wheel for
traction against plaintiff's leg and broke it. Defendant demurred on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action in that it affirmatively showed that the injury received by plaintiff was due to his being struck by a piece
of timber and not by an automobile. The trial court overruled the demurrer and defendant appealed.
In reversing this decision the majority of the Court found
no uncertainty or ambiguity in the language of the policy and
held that plaintiff was not struck by an automobile within
the meaning thereof. Although stating that the language was
too plain to call for judicial construction the Court cited
14. 238 S. C.301, 120 S. E. 2d 15.
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decisions from other jurisdictions which interpreted the provisions as requiring personal contact with the automobile
itself.
In a dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Lewis took the position
that the language in question was susceptible of other meaning than the strict interpretation adopted by the majority.
He pointed out that the word "by" has been defined as
meaning "through", "through the medium of", "through the
means of", and "in consequence of". Accordingly, Mr. Justice
Lewis was of the opinion that it was immaterial that the
plaintiff was struck with a piece of timber rather than some
part of the automobile itself.
The case of Miller v. British America Assur. Ca. 15 involved
a dispute between an insurance company and its insured as
to the extent of damage to the insured's cabin cruiser during
a windstorm. The insurer, among other things, set up as a
defense that the policy contained provisions providing for
arbitration through the appointment of appraisers in the
event the amount of loss was in dispute. The Supreme Court
upheld the validity of such provisions in the policy and determined that compliance with such provisions, if demanded
by the insurer, is a condition precedent to the right of the insured to maintain an action on the policy unless such provisions are waived by the insurer.
In Rhame v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co.,16 the plaintiff
sought to recover under the medica. payment provision of
his liability insurance policy for medical expenses incurred
on behalf of two of his employees who were injured while
riding in the insured vehicle. It was admitted that the injuries arose out of and in the course of employment for the
insured. The defendant insurance company contended that
recovery was excluded by the following provision:
This policy does not apply:
(g) under division 1 of coverage C, to bodily injury to
or sickness, disease or death of any employee of the
named insured or spouse arising out of and in the course
of (1) domestic employment by the named insured or
spouse, if benefits therefor are in whole or in part either
payable or required to be provided under any workmen's
compensation law, or (2) other employment by the named
insured or his spouse.
15. 238 S. C. 94, 119 S. E. 2d 527.
16. 238 S. C. 539, 121 S. E. 2d 94.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss1/12

10

Walker: Insurance

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

The trial judge ruled that the provision was ambiguous
and allowed the plaintiff to offer extrinsic evidence on same.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the trial judge, holding that there was no ambiguity in the subject policy. The
Court stated that:
A careful reading and study of the exclusion provision
as is contained in Section (g) of the policy in question
convinces us that the truck driver and his assistant,
both of whom were employees, as farm laborers, of the
respondent, are excluded from medical coverage under
portion (2) of Section (g) above quoted.
For this reason the Court concluded that the trial judge
should have directed a verdict for the defendant insurer.
In the case of Stanley v. Reserve Ins. Co., 17 plaintiff had
been involved in a collision with an insured of the defendant
company. The policy in question designated the insured's
truck as the insured vehicle, but not the trailer, and it contained a clause excluding coverage when the insured vehicle
was used for towing a trailer not covered by like insurance in
the company. When the accident with plaintiff occurred,
the trailer which the insured truck was towing was not
covered by like insurance in the company, and for this reason,
defendant denied liability. In holding for the defendant, our
Court held that an automobile liability insurer whose policy
excluded a truck or automobile from coverage while towing an
uninsured trailer was not liable for damages sustained when
the insured's truck, while towing such an uninsured trailer,
collided with another vehicle, even though the policy concededly was procured to comply with the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act, which provided that no violation
of the policy should defeat or void the policy.
In the case of Czarles v. Canal Ins. Co.,' the insurer had
issued to the plaintiff a policy covering the latter's tractor
and trailer against loss or damage by collision or upset. In
the main body of the contract, the policy purported to give
coverage to each unit to the extent of its actual cash value
less a specified deductible amount. However, the policy contained an endorsement, issued the same date as the policy,
delivered with the policy and attached to the policy, which the
defendant alleged limited the amount of coverage on each
17. 238 S. C. 533, 121 S. E. 2d 10.

18. 238 S. C. 600,121 S. E. 2d 200.
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unit to $2,000.00 less the deductible amount. The endorsement referred to the coverage afforded under a portion of the
policy designated as "B-1 COLLISION OR UPSET." There
was no such clause contained in the policy although there

was in Item 3, Sub-section "B" of the DECLARATIONS just
such a provision as that referred to. In a suit instituted under
the policy for recovery of the actual value of the units which
were a total loss, less deductible and salvage, the lower court
affirmed the trial judge's direction of a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount claimed, leaving to the jury simply
the duty of designating the value of the units. The Supreme
Court in a three to two decision through Acting Justice
McFadden affirmed the decision of the trial judge holding
that the disparity as to the reference in the endorsement
constituted an ambiguity in the policy and that in such event
it became necessary to construe that provision to the benefit
of the insured.
In a rather vigorous dissent concurred in by Justice Moss,
Justice Legge wrote that there was no ambiguity and that
the endorsement attached to the policy was effective to limit
coverage as to each unit to a maximum of $2,000.00 less deductible since the endorsement obviously referred to Section
B pertaining to the amount of coverage.
Other questions of policy construction were involved in the
case of South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co.19
which was decided during this survey period. However, the
facts were so unusual that it is felt that this case is of little
significance with respect to the general application and practice of insurance law in this State.
Actions For Fraudulent Breach of Contract
20
In the case of Dunnaway v. United Ins. Co. of America,
the plaintiff had made claim for certain sick benefits and
hospital payments under a policy issued by the defendant.
The claim was denied and the defendant's agent returned to
the plaintiff the premiums paid under the policy receiving in
consideration therefor a release of all claims. The check was

thereafter negotiated by the plaintiff who at no time prior
to commencing an action for fraudulent breach of contract
accompanied by a fraudulent act offered to return to the
19. 238 S. C. 248, 120 S. E. 2d 111.
20. 239 S. C. 407, 123 S. E. 2d 353.
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defendant the amount for which the check had been drawn.
Our Court once again applied the general principle that one
who seeks to avoid the effect of a release must first return
or tender the consideration paid therefor and that since
plaintiff had not done this, the lower court properly directed
a verdict for the defendant.
Disability and Medical Benefits
In the case of Shealy v. United Ins. Co. of America,21 the
insured brought an action on a sickness benefit policy claiming total disability under the following provision:
If such sickness causes continuous total disability and
total loss of time, and requires continuous confinement
within doors and regular and personal attendance therein by a licensed physician, surgeon, osteopath or chiropractor, other than the insured, the Company will pay
at the rate of the monthly benefit stated in the policy
schedule ....
The evidence showed that the insured was 61 years of age,
living alone, and was afflicted with chronic thrombphlebitis;
that on occasions he drove to his doctor's office, went to see
his neighbors, and went to a nearby store to get medicine
and supplies. The defendant-insurer denied liability, contending that the insured was not totally disabled within the
quoted terms of the policy. The question was submitted to
the jury and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff. On appeal
the judgment was affirmed, the Supreme Court holding that
the purpose of the "continuous confinement within doors"
clause is to make certain of the disability of the insured and
that it should be construed as merely expressing the required
degree of disability, not necessarily requiring actual confinement within doors. In rejecting a literal construction the
Court stated that there was no evidence that the insured was
able to resume the ordinary duties or pleasures of life and
the fact that at intervals he may have stepped into his yard
or made visits to his physician's office and other short and
unusual trips was not sufficient within the meaning of the
insurance contract to say as a matter of law that he was not
continuously confined within doors and regularly attended
therein by a licensed physician.
21. 239 S. C. 71, 121 S. E. 2d 345.
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The case of Garrett v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co.22 was
an action to recover total disability benefit on several policies
issued by the defendant insurance company. Each policy contained a provision defining total disability as the inability by
reason of accidental bodily injury or sickness to earn in excess
of one-fourth of the insured's former earned income. The
policies further defined "earned income" as follows:
As herein used the term "earned income" means wages,
salaries, professional fees, and other amounts, received
as compensation for personal services actually rendered
in any profession, trade or business, not including therein amounts received as a pension or retirement allowance,
or as a temporary continuance in whole or in part of
customary earned income during the insured's enforced
absence from business on account of accidental bodily
injury or sickness.
On appeal from a judgment for the insured the Supreme
Court in accordance with its earlier decision in Dunly v.
Maryland Cas. Co.28 construed the quoted provision to mean
income received by the insured either from his customary
employment or from any other employment in a profession,
trade or business for which his training and aptitude fit him.
The Court rejected the insurance company's contention that
it was entitled to a directed verdict because the evidence
showed that the insured had been engaged in a coin collecting
business in which he earned more than one-fourth of his
former earned income. The Court pointed out that there was
no evidence that the insured was engaged in coin collecting as
a business and held that the benefit dervied from the pursuit
of a hobby would not deprive the insured of his right to
recover for total disability under the terms of the subject
policies.
In Gordon v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.2 4 the insured was injured
in an accident and was hospitalized and treated at the Fort
Jackson Hospital. Being a career soldier his medical expenses
were paid by the Federal Government. In due time insured
filed claim under the medical payment provisions of his
liability insurance policy for a sum which he estimated to be
the reasonable cost of his hospitalization and medical expenses.
22. 239 S. C. 574, 124 S. E. 2d 36.

23. 203 S. C. 1, 25 S. E. 2d 881.
24. 238 S. C. 438, 120 S. E. 2d 509.
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The defendant company refused payment contending that the
subject policy only obligated the insurer to pay "expenses
incurred" and that the plaintiff had not "incurred" any
expenses for the hospitalization and treatment at Fort Jackson. Suit was instituted and upon the trial court's refusal
to sustain a demurrer to the complaint, the insurer appealed.
After quoting from numerous decisions interpreting the term
"expenses incurred" the Supreme Court held that since there
was no obligation on the part of the insured to pay for the
hospitalization he received at Fort Jackson Hospital, he
"incurred" no expenses within the meaning of the provision
of the policy or insurance issued by the insurer.
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